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Courts, by the statutes referred to. It is a standard authority on the
general law, independent of legislation."
We do not think that the existence of malice, in publishing a libel
or uttering slanderous words, can make any difference in the juris-
diction of the court. Malice is charged in almost every case of libel,
and no case of authority can be found, independent of statute, in
which the power to issue an injunction to restrain a libel or slander-
ous words, has ever been maintained, whether malice was charged
or not.
Charges of libel and slander are peculiarly adapted to and require
trial by jury, and exercising as we do, authority, under a system of
government and law, which, by a fundamental article, secures the
right of trial by jury, in all cases at common law, and which, by
express statute, declares that suits in equity shall not be sustained
in any case where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had
at law, as has always heretofore been considered the case in cases
of libel and slander, we do not think that we would be justified in
extending the remedy of injunction to such cases. The application
for injunction must be denied, and the auxiliary bill is dismissed
with costs.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.1
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA.
2
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.s
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND '
SUPREME COURT OF 0O. 5
AGENT. See Bills and Notes.
ASSIGNMENT. See Deed; G ft.
ATTACHMENT.
Foreign Attachment- Certificate of Stock.-Tbe defendants, residing
in the state of Indiana and owning stock in a bank located there, lodged
I From J. Hooker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 53 Conn. Rep.
2 From D. C. Wilson, Esq., Clerk. The cases will probably appear in 21 or 22
Florida Rep.
3 From Ron. N. L. Freeman, Relorter; to appear in 117 Ill. Rep.
4 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 65 Md. Reports.
5 F'rom Geo. B. Okey, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 44 or
45 Ohio St. Reports.
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a certificate of the stock, with a blank power to sell and transfer it, with
a corporation in this state as collateral security for a loan, its value being
considerably in excess of the loan. Held, that their equitable interest
in the stock could not be reached by the process of foreign attachment
in this state: Winslow v. Fletcher, 53 Conn.
Suit on Bond- What is "improperly" Suing out Attachment.-An
attachment is "improperly" sued out within the meaning of the statute
when the plaintiff has no meritorious cause of action of that class in
which the statute authorizes this remedy, or having such a cause
of action, the ground alleged in the affidavi for its issue is untrue, or
not one of the grounds enumerated which must exist before it can be
obtained : Steen v. Ross, 21 or 22 Fla.
Where the plaintiff has a meritorious cause of action of the class for
which an attachment may lawfully issue, and the cause for its issuance
is one of those specified in the statute, and such cause is true, a dissolu-
tion of the attachment for some mere irregularity in the papers, is not
ground for recovery on the attachment bond for" improperly" suing out
the attachment: Id.
In an action on an attachment bond for "1 improperly" suing out the
attachment, the declaration must state in what the impropriety of the
issue of the attachment, within the meaning of the statute, consisted,
and it is not sufficient to allege simply that it was improperly issued : Id.
ATTORNEY. See Corporation; Eiddence.
BANK.
Certfied Check-Liability thereon-Collection of Check--egligence.
-A bank which certifies a check drawn upon it, is primarily liable for
its payment, the same as upon a promissory note or bond given by it:
Drovers' Nat. Bank v. Anglo American Packing and Provision do., 117
Ill.
A bank taking a certified check on another bank, either as a payment,
on account, or for the purpose, only, of collection, is entitled to show that
the check has availed nothing, when the bank so receiving the same has
discharged its duty by an effort to collect it : Id.
But if the bank receiving such check, 'either on account or for col-
lection, sends the same directly to the debtor bank for payment, and the
debt is lost in consequence thereof, the bank so transmitting the check
must bear the loss: Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
Property of the Bankrupt-Subscription Price of Stock of an Incor-
porated Company-Discharge of Stockholder in Bankruptcy Actions
against Bankrupt for an Unpaid Instalment-Debt not Provable in
Bankruptcy.-The law will not compel an assignee in bankruptcy to
accept property of the bankrupt which is onerous, and will yield nothing
toward the payment of his debts: Glenn v. Howard, 65 Md.
Where the subscription price of the stock of an incorporated company,
was only to be paid in such instalments, and at such times, as it should
be called for by the company, and at the time of the bankruptcy of a
stockholder, and for a considerable time thereafter, no call for the pay-
ment of his subscription had been made, the discharge in bankruptcy,
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under the late bankrupt law of the United States, of such stockholder,
is no bar to an action against him for an instalment of his subscription,
subsequently called for; the unpaid subscription for the stock not con-
stituting such a debt or liability as was provable against his estate in
bankruptcy, under the provisions of the bankrupt law: Id.
BILLs AND NoTEs. See Partnership.
Acceptance by Agent-Liability of Agent-Parol Proof.-The drawee
of a bill of exchange, drawn by the " Kanawha & Ohio Coal Co.," was
described in the bill as "John A. Robinson, Agt.," and it was accepted
by him as "John A. Robinson, Agent K. & 0. C. Co." Held, that the
acceptance so made was the personal obligation of John A. Robinson,
and that in a suit upon the acceptance by an endorsee against him, parol
evidence was not admissible, in the absence of fraud, accident or mis-
take, to show that the defendant so accepted the bill, intending to bind
the drawer as his principal, and that this fact was known to the plaintiff
at the time it became the owner and holder of it: Robinson v. Kanawha
Val. Bank, 44 or 45 Ohio St.
Promissory Note-Fraud-Burden of Proof-Bona Fide Holder for
Value-Enowledge of Facts Impeaching Validity.-If fraud in the pro-
curefient of a note be shown, the onus is cast upon the plaintiff to show
that he paid value for the note before maturity, and under circumstances
that created no presumption that he knew of the existence of the facts
that impeached the validity of the instrument: Grampton v. Perkins,
65 Md.
A bona fide holder of a negotiable instrument for valuable consider-
ation, without notice, will be protected against the antecedent equities
of the original parties ; Id.
But actual knowledge of the impeaching facts at the time of taking
the paper, notwithstanding value is paid, will defeat recovery on it: .1d.
Alteration-Effect of-Burden of Proof.-If the acceptor of a bill
of exchange allege affirmatively that it has been altered materially and
without his authority since he accepted it, the burden is upon him to
prove the alleged alteration. The production of the bill will, if the
alteration is apparent upon its fact, make a prima facie case for the
acceptor and throw the burden upon the holder to show that the alter-
ation was made before it was accepted. The party producing and claim-
ing under the paper must explain every apparent material alteration and
remove every suspicion thereof, of which there is evidence on its face,
before he can recover. If there is nothing upon the face of the bill to
indicate or to put one on notice as to the alteration, the acceptor must
prove it by extraneous testimony: Harris v. Bank of Tacksonville, 21
or 22 Fla.
The bill of exchange in question was drawn on a printed blank form,
all the blanks being filled in the handwriting of C. F. R., in whose hand-
writing were also the words "payable at Metropolitan National Bank,
New York City." The words "Accepted, James A. Harris," in Har-
ris handwriting, were in red ink, and the other writing on the paper in
black ink: Held, that there was apparent, upon the face of the bill of
exchange, no alteration, nor any presumptive evidence or reasonable
ground for suspicion thereof: Id.
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CHECK. See Bank.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Insolvent Law-Effect of on Oontract with Citizen of another State-
Subscription to Corporation.-Where the subscription price of the stock
of a company incorporated under the laws of Virginia, was only to be
paid in such instalments, and at such times, as it should be called for
by the company, and at the time of the insolvency of a stockholder, and
of his discharge under the insolvent law of Maryland, no call for the
payment of his subscription had been made, such discharge of the stock-
holder is no bar to an action against him for an instalment of his sub-
scription subsequently called for, even though the unpaid subscription
may have constituted, at the time of the discharge of the insolvent, a
debt or contract within the meaning of the insolvent law-the insolvent
law of this state not operating to discharge a contract made with a cit-
izen or corporation of another state:. Glenn v. Clabauh, 65 Md.
Eminent Domain-Taking Land for Cemetery Purposes.-The burial
of the dead being a necessity, land may be taken for the purpose under
the authority of the state: Evergreen Cemetery Association v. Beecher,
53 Conn.
And land taken for such a purpose by a corporation authorized to
establish and conduct a cemetery, is taken for public use, if all the pub-
lic have a right of burial there, even though the expense may operate
practically to exclude some: id.
But a corporation does not take land for a public use where the public
have not, and cannot acquire, the right to bury in it: Id.
Impeaching Validity of Statute-Effect of Journals of Legislature.
Where the journal of each house of the general assembly shows that
a law received the concurrence of the number of members required by
the constitution for its adoption, and that it was publicly signed in the
presence of each house by its presiding officer as required by sect. 17,
art. 2, of the constitution, its authenticity cannot be impeached by parol
evidence that one or more of the members in either house, recorded as
concurring in its adoption, had, prior thereto, been seated upon the de-
termination of a contested election, by less than a constitutiondl quo-
rum, although the concurrence of such member, or members, was neces-
sary to the number of votes required by the constitution for the passage
of the law: State v. Iierron, 44 or 45 Ohio St.
CONTRACT. See Damages.
Conditional Acceptance of an offer to Sell-Receipt of a Deposit.-
To constitute a contract of sale of land by the acceptance of an offer to
sell, the acceptance must be unconditional. No contract will result from
a letter in reply, that the party will accept the offer "provided the title
is perfect." At any time before an unconditional acceptance of an offer
and compliance with its terms it may be withdrawn : Corcoran v. White,
117 11.
The agents for the owner or party having the power to sell a lot, gave
to a party desirous of purchasing the same, a receipt, as follows: "R e-
ceived of J. H. W., attorney for T. R. C , his check for $500, as deposit
on account of proposed purchase of sub-lot 2, &c., said sum of $500,
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when paid, to apply on said purchase of said lot at $8000 cash, or to be
returned to him in case said sale cannot be perfected, say within sixty
days from this date, or in case the title should prove defective, it being
understood that we are to forward a deed to the owner of said lot and
recommend its execution. Lyman & Giddings :" Held, not the evidence
of a contract of sale, but only a proposed purchase and agreement of
the agents to forward a deed and recommend its execution: Id.
COPYRIGHT.
OQidal Reports of Cases-Right of Judges and Reporter.-The judges
and the reporter being paid by the state, the product of their mental
labor is the property of the state, and the state has power to take for
itself a copyright of it, and it is for the state to say when and in what
manner the decisions of the court shall be published: Gould v. Banks,
53 Conn.
The taking of the copyright does not offend the rule that judicial
proceedings shall be public. The courts and their records are open
to all. The reasons given by the judges for their determination in a
particular case constitute no part of the record therein ; and these are
accessible to all who desire to use them in the enforcement of their
rights: Id.
CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law.
Officers-Power to Emnloy Attorney-Comromise of Suit-Rat'fi-
cation.-Where the by-laws of a private corporation for pecuniary gain
make it the duty of its president to exercise a general supervision over
its entire business, and irovide that all the property of the company
shall be under his control, and such president for a nuniber of years
before had acted as its attorney, and looked after its affairs in the courts,
this will be evidence of his authority to employ attorneys to appear for
the corporation and look after its interests : Wetherbee v. Fitch, 117 11.
The authority of an attorney to prosecute a suit does not involve au-
thority to compromise it. Before he can compromise the suit he must
have special authority for that purpose: -d.
Where negotiations by an attorney employed to prosecute an ejeetment
suit in the name of a corporation, but in fact for the benefit of one of its
creditors, for the compromise thereof, were well known to the president
and secretary of the company intrusted with its affairs, and they and
the attorneys frequently advised as to the suit, and they made no objec-
tion to taking a sum in money instead of the land, and the company
after the compromise, accepted the benefit of the settlement in the pay
ment of a part of its indebtedness, it was held, that its conduct amounted
to a ratification of the compromise of its attorneys: -d.
CRimiNAL LAw. See Habeas-Corpue.
Possession of S t olen Property, as Evidence of Guilt-Explanation of
such Possession-Degree of Proof.-It is error for the court, 6n trial of
one for larceny, to instruct the jury that the possession of the stolen
property soon after the theft is sufficient to convict, unless such posses-
sion is satisfactorily explained, and that an alibi must be clearly and
satisffictorily proved before that defence can avail : Hoge v. The People,
117 Ill.
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The burden of proof is on the people to establish a defendant's guilt
of the crime charged; and when the defendant charged with larceny
introduces evidence to explain his recent possession of the stolen pro-
perty, and tending to establish an alibi, if the jury, after considering
the evidence introduced by him as to either or both such questions, in
connection with the other evidence, have a reasonable doubt of his guilt,
they should acquit: .d.
Waters v. 1he People, 104 Ill. 544, distinguished: Id.
DAMAGES.
Breaeh of Contract of Sale of Personal Property-Market Price.-
The rule for the assessment of damages for the breach of a contract for
the sale of personal property, is the difference between the market price
of the article, if there is a market price, where it is to be delivered, and
the contract price: Equitable Gas Light Co. v. Balt. Coal Tar and
.Manufacturing Co., 65 Md.
If there is no such. market price at the place of delivery, and the
goods are costly and difficult of transportation 'from a distance, and are
intended to be used for manufacturing purposes, then the market price
may be arrived at by deducting the cost of manufacturing and the price
of the raw material from the market price of the manufactured article:
id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Retention of Possession- Taking of Possession before Rights of Cred-
itors Aecrue.-A vendee who takes possession at a time subsequent to
the sale, but before the rights of creditors have accrued by attachment
or otherwise, can hold the property against creditors: Gilbert v. Decker,
53 Conn.
The retention of possession raises a presumption of fraud only in favor
of attaching creditors or those who stand in their position : Id.
The presumption of fraud does not exist in the case of the sale of
property exempt from execution: Id.
DE EIT.
When Action .aintainable.-The plaintiff alleged in his complaint
that as a sub-contractor in the construction of a building for the defend-
ant, he had an inchoate lien on the property for his claim and was about
to take proceedings to perfect it, when the defendant, for the purpose
of preventing his doing so, falsely represented to him that she had paid
the original contractor in full and that nothing was dde him ; and that
the plaintiff, believing the representation, did not perfect .his lien and
thereby lost it; claiming damages for the false representation : .7eld,
on a demurrer to the complaint, that it presented a good cause of action:
Alexander v. Church, 53 Conn.
And held not to affect the case that it did not appear that the orig-
inal contractor was irresponsible, nor that a demand had been made on
him for payment. The plaintiff was entitled to his lien as security, with-
out reference to his remedy against the original contractor: I.
DEED.
Recordng-Priority-Bo.z-de Purchaser-Assignee for Benefd of
Creditors.-MI. made a deed t,, A. of a house and lot for a valuable con-
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sideration. The deed was delivered on the 1st of January 1883, but by
oversight was not left for record until the 19th of March 1884. On the
17th of March 1884, M. made an assignment of all his property for the
benefit of his creditors, in consideration of which they executed a gen-
eral release of all claims and demands against him. This deed was
recorded on the day of its date, two days prior to the deed of A.: Held,
1st. That the provision of sect. 16, of art. 24, of the code, declaring
that where there are two or more deeds conveying the same property,
the deed or deeds which shall be first recorded according to law, shall be
preferred, if made bona fide and upon good and valuable consideration,
refers to deeds as between persons who have either paid or advanced
money upon the faith of the grantor's actual title to the property trans-
ferred, or who have accepted specific property in payment of a specific
debt. 2d. That an assignee of all the debtor's property for the benefit
of his creditors is not a bona fide purchaser within the meaning of the
code, even though the creditors have executed a general release of all
claims and demands against the debtor in consideration of the assign-
ment: Tyler v. Abergh, 65 Md.
Whether if the release had been executed on the faith of the debtor's
ownership of the house and lot which he had previously sold, this would
have constituted the assignee or the creditors bonafide purchasers within
the meaning of the code, Qu--re ? id.
Construction-Premises on Bank of River- Canal-Dissolution of
Canal Company-Reversion of Fee.-A general deed of premises lying
upon the bank of a river, in which is constructed a canal, conveys the
grantor's rights to the centre bf the stream bounding the property. And
to reverse or exclude from the grant any such rights, the conveyance
should contai proper words of such reservation or exclusion : Day v.
Pittsburgh, .1. & G. Rd., 44 or 45 Ohio St.
Where the canal company, owning and operating such canal, had the
right only to use for canal purposes, the bed and waters of such river,
on ouster of such company from its corporate franchises and its dissolu-
tion by order of this court, the trustees winding up its affairs have no
power to convey such rights, but they revert to the proper owners : Id.
EQUITY.
Will not aid Party Guilty of Fraud- Qualification of Rule.-Where
a debtor understandingly and deliberately conveys away his property to
hinder or defraud his creditors, a court of equity will not lend him its
aid to recover it back: Nichols v. McCarthy, 53 Conn.
But whether a party guilty of an independent fraud in receiving or
retaining property upon such a conveyance should be allowed to avail
himself of the fact that the conveyance to him was made to defraud
creditors, as a defence against a suit to recover the property back, qumere.
The. court inclined to the opinion that such a qualification of the rule
would be reasonable : Id.
EVIDENOE.
.Attormney-Privieged Communications.-Instructions by a grantor to
an attorney drawing a deed are not ordinarily privileged communications.
If the grantor had instructed the attorney to make the conveyance to
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the grantee in trust, it would 'be competent for the attorney to testify
that such were the instructions: Todd v. Munson, 53 Conn.
Death-Efect of Competency of Witness.-It is only where the suit
is upon the cause of action, to which one party is dead, that the other
party is excluded, to preserve mutuality: Homer v. Frazier, 65 Nd.
Where such contract only incidentally arises in another suit, on an
other contract and about something else, as matter of evidence touching
this suit, the death of one party to it does not close the mouth of the
other; but he is a competent witness : Id.
EXECUTION. See Partnership.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Imrpounding Share of Devisee to pay Judgment.-Where a testator
devises the rest and residue of his estate, after the payment of his debts,
among his ten children, equally, the share of each child to be charged
with all advances made or to be made to him or her, the administrators
with the will annexed have the right, as against the judgment creditors
of one of such children, to impound so much of his share, as may be
necessary to pay a judgment recovered against such administrators on a
bond of such child on which the testator was the surety: Stieff v. Col-
lins, 65 Md.
FRAUD. See Debtor and Creditor.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Pleading.-It is not necessary in pleading to allege a promise to which
the Statute of Frauds applies, to be in writing. If it appear in the
proof, at the trial, to be in writing it is sufficient: Horner v. Frazier,
65 Md.
A plea, in addition to the general issue plea, that the promise was
not in writing, is an argumentative answer to the declaration, asserting
nothing which is not cognizable under the general issue, and is therefore
demurrable: Id.
Sale of Land-Description.-An agreement for the sale of land under
the Statute of Frauds will be held sufficient as to its description of the
land to be conveyed, if it so describes a particular piece or tract of land
that it can be identified, located or found. A detailed description is not
necessary. Where the descriptibn shows that a particular tract is within
the minds of the contracting parties and intended to be conveyed, parol
evidence may be resorted to, to apply the description or identify the
tract, though such description be somewhat general : Lernte v. Clark,
21 or 22 Fla.
GIFT.
Assignment of Stock-DelveryTrust.-A father made an assign-
ment under seal to his daughter of certain shares of stock in a corpora-
tion. The certificates for this stock at the date of said assignment had
been made out in due form in the name of the assignor, but remained
in the certificate book of the corporation just as they were executed, and
uncut therefrom. The assignment appeared on its face to be for value,
but was in fact intended as a gift, and not as a sale. The assignment,
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which contained no power of attorney authorizing the transfer of the
stock, was left by the assignor with the attorney of the corporation, with
whom also was left the book of certificates, with instruction that upon
obtaining the assent of a mortgagee of the corporation, the transfer of
the stock should be made to the daughter on the books of the company.
No transfer, however, was made in the lifetime of the father. On a bill
filed by the daughter against the corporation after her father'p death, -to
compel a transfer of the stock, it was held, 1st. That the assignment was
imperfect without an actual transfer of the stock on the books of the
corporation, and equity could not make that good and enforcible as a
gift inter vivos, which was incomplete, and, therefore, not enforcible at
law. 2d. That there was no element of trust in the case upon which
the claim of the assignee could be supported. 3d. That if the father
had declared that he held, or would thenceforth hold the shares of stock
in trust for his daughter, then perhaps equity would seize upon and en-
force such trust for the benefit of the donee, although voluntarily cre-
ated : Baltimore Retort and Fire Brick Co. v. .Mali, 65 Md.
HABEAS CORPUS.
Uise to review Judgment at Law.-The writ of habeas corpus does not
lie to review a judgment at law, for an alleged error in the proceedings
in a case, where the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of
the person: E-a parte Srmith, 117 Il.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus showed that the petitioner was
regularly brought before the grand jury as a witness; that he refused to
answer certain questions propounded to him, and that the court there-
upon fined him twenty-five -dollars, and on refusal to pay the same, or-
dered him to stand committed to the county jail until the fine and the
costs should be paid: .Hfeld, that if the court erred in imposing the fine,
the remedy was by appeal or writ of error, and not by the writ sought.
If the order had been simply a committal until the petitioner answered
the questions, a different question would be presented: Id.
HIGHWAY. See Negligence.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Alimony.-Suit in Foreign State.-A. and P. were married in West
Virginia, at their domicile, where A. retained his domicile, but P. went
to Tennessee, where, in ex parte proceedings, she obtained a divorce d
vinculo from A., but, as there was no personal service upon A., her ap-
plication for alimony was dismissed without prejudice, and to enable her
to sue for it, elsewhere. She then brought suit here for alimony alone,
and to reaclh certain property in Ohio belonging to A.; in which case
she obtained service upon A., who'also appeared and filed pleadings in
the case, and on trial the court found sufficient cause, and allowed
her alimony: Held, P. had a right thus to bring her action for alimony
alone, and she could have her claim therefor determined, and, if sus-
tained upon trial, the court could allow her reasonable alimony out of the
property of A.: Woods v. Waddle, 44 or 45 Ohio St.
INJUNCTION. See Mortgage.
INSOLVENT LAW. See Constitutional Law.
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MORTGAGE.
Personal Poperty-Destruction by ffMortgaor-Injunction.-A court
of equity will prevent, by injunction, a mortgagor from impairing the
value of, or destroying the property embraced in the mortgage-lien, on
which the mortgagee has a right, by virtue of his mortgage, to rely
for the security of his debt: Logan v. Slade, 21 or 22 Fla.
When a merchant, on the day after the execution of a mortgage on
his stock of goods, in favor of some of his creditors, disposes of a large
amount of them to other creditors, in payment of their debts, a court of
equity is justified in enjoining him from selling said goods otherwise
than for cash, and commanding him to pay the proceeds, after deduct-
ing expenses of sale, into the registry of the court: Id.
If the remedy by injunction as above, proves to be ineffectual, the
court may appoint a receiver to take charge of the goods, and dispose of
them under its direction : Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Bank.
Owner of Factory near Highway- Open Area.-The defendant
owned a factory, set back ten feet from the line of a city street, and run-
ning along the street, eighty-eight feet, with the space in front, paved
like the adjoining sidewalk, and of the same grade. In front of the
factory was a porch extending a little way towards the street, with a
door in it, used as the main entrance, and by the side of the porch, a
depressed area extending along the building, about ten feet long, three
feet wide and five deep, with no railing to protect persons from falling
in. The plaintiff, on a lawful errand, undertook to go in the evening
from the street to the porch, and, without want of care, fell into the
open area and was injured: held, that the defendant was liable: C'rogan
v. Schiele, 53 Conn.
Where a person has so made the way leading to a building on his
premises, as to invite people to pass along the way to such building, he
is bound to keep the way clear of dangers : Id.
And it is not necessary in such a case, that the person using the way
should be a traveller on the highway: Id.
OFFICERs.
School Directors-Fraudulent omission to defend Suit-Relief against
Judgment.-Persons accepting the position of school directors should
not allow their private interest to conflict with public duty; and equity
and good faith will require them to defend suits against "the district, and
protect its property, to the best of their skill and ability, regardless of
any private interest they may have: Noble v. School Directors, 11 Ill.
Persons were elected school directors of a school district, pending a
bill by two of them against the district, seeking to divest the district of
property purchased by it, and they discharged the solicitors employed
by their predecessors to defend, and interposed no defence whatever, but
allowed a decree to pass in their favor against the district by default. It
was held, that as the decree was obtained by breach of official trust, it
should not be binding on the district, and would be set aside on a bill
by the district, as being obtained by fraud and breach of duty, and a
defence allowed: Id.
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The rule that denies a party equitable relief against a judgment or
decree when he has been guilty of negligence in making a defence, does
not apply to the case of public officers, who, for their own private ends,
and with selfish motives, allow a judgment or decree to pass against the
interests of the public they should represent, for the reason that the pub-
lic can defend only by and through its proper representatives : Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Power of Partner to sign Note-Non-trading Partnership.-In the
case of non-trading partnerships, the individual partners have not the
same implied authority as in commercial partnerships, to bind the firm
by note, executed in the name of the firm: Pease v. Cole, 53 Conn.
In such a case the presumption of want of authority may be overcome
by proof of express authority, or of such a state of facts as justly
implies authority: Id.
These facts may be a course of conduct on the part of the firm, the
usage of similar partnerships, the necessities of the business, or a ratifi-
cation of the act by receiving the benefit of it: Id.
A partnership formed for conducting a theatre, is one of the non-
trading class : .1d.
PATENT. See Payment.
PAYMENT.
When Voluntary-Purchase of License under worthless Patent.-
Where a party with full knowledge, actual or imputed, of the facts,
voluntarily without duress, fraud or extortion, pays money upon a
demand, though not enforcible against him, he cannot recover it back:
Schwarzenbach v. The Odorless Excavating Apparatus Co., 65 Md.
A. relying wholly on the representations of B., made, without fraud,
contracted to pay, and did pay B., a fixed sum for the privilege of operat-
ing under a certain patent, of which he was the owner. It afterwards
turned out that the patent was void; held, that A. could not maintain
an action for money had and received, against B., to recover back the
money paid under said contract: Id.
PLEADING. See Fhrauds, Statute of.
TRADE-MARK.
Use of Person's own Name.-A manufacturer has the right to use his
own name as a mark upon his goods, although it be the same name with
that of another manufacturer of the same goods, who makes the name
a part of his own trade-mark, where there is no false representation in
such use; and the majority of the court regarded the absence of all
fraudulent designs and acts established by the finding of facts in the
court below: Rogers v. Rogers, 53 Conn.
TRUST. See Gift.
